Complexities of Transboundary Water Conflict in South Asia
Transboundary waters account for over 60 percent of the world’s freshwater and 153 countries share at least one of the 286 transboundary rivers and lakes. 1 In South Asiai , every single country share two or more major rivers and countless tributaries with one or more neighbours, with the obvious exception of Sri Lanka. As a region, it is one of the fastest growing in terms of population, with a vast disparity in economic growth and development across the region and within countries. There is a long history of conflict and a lack of diplomatic cohesion in the region. It is also one of the most sensitive regions when it comes to water security. It is also one of the least water secure regions of the world. There are also challenges posed by uncertainties in the climate, rapidly shifting weather patterns and a paucity of granular hydrological data. The existing treaties and agreements do not reflect the changing realities of present times and are constantly under threat due to political disagreements and regional security concerns. Although water may not be the direct cause of conflict, it often is embroiled in ongoing unrest and becomes a threat multiplier.
According to the World Water Organisation, more than 1200 conflicts are linked with water, dating back to 2500 BC.2 The use of water as an instrument in a conflict is an old practice to consolidate a nation-state’s position. Poisoning water resources, cutting off supply, using water as a bargaining tool, diverting flow, or deliberately releasing water to flood an area are all methods of water warfare and date back centuries. During the second stage of the SinoJapanese War in 1938, Chiang Kai-shek, a Chinese nationalist who served as the leader of the Republic of China, ordered the removal of dikes of the Huayuankou (the Henan section of the Huang He (Yellow) River) to flood the area and prevent the movement of Japanese forces from overtaking the area. Another example is of the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who drained the Hammar marshes in southern Iraq to punish Shiites in the area for rebelling against his regime.
Water data and water security are often seen as a national security issue in South Asia, where economies are still heavily water-dependent for economic development in sectors like agriculture, industry, energy, and sanitation, leading to further shrinking of potential cooperative spaces. Moreover, the lack of data collection and sharing also proves detrimental to creating effective mechanisms for cooperation. For instance, while most countries adhere to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)’s unified data policy, the focus is more on meteorological data rather than hydrological data.
As we experience extreme climate events, the demand for an overused but under-appreciated resource is likely to soar, bringing forth further areas of competition yet to be examined. Growing populations and urbanisation with higher standards of living and consumption patterns, create systems that rely heavily on scarce water resources. This often forces governments and non-state actors to justify any and all means of acquiring the resource, be it by stressing the environment or enacting policy that further widens existing socio-economic gaps. The resulting conflict might then seem disconnected from water, but the intersections still exist. The degradation of the environment and destruction of resources provided by the environment can compromise security and cause conflict. This conflict in turn influences the environment, surrounding ecology, and resources by causing direct damage and disruption of productivity. Equally, poor environmental and resource practices can increase vulnerability and the risk of conflict. In South Asia, a region so closely intertwined by the environment and shared ecology, we see this occurring on a regular basis – from monsoons to earthquakes and glacial floods to rising heat and pollution.
A Difficult Neighbourhood
The South Asian region, marked by persistent border disputes and tensions among two nuclear powers, faces additional complexities driven by relations with China. These issues create a double challenge, mixing two types of risks. First, there’s a growing concern about security due to the complex relationships and historical grievances among the nations in the area. Second, there is an added concern with the changing climate and environment, displaying how ecological problems add to the overall risks in the region. The case of the Indus Water Treaty and Greater Brahmaputra Basin are illustrative of this complexity.
On 25 January 2023, India decided to issue a notice to Pakistan in accordance with Article XII of the treaty for modification in the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT). The treaty establishes the terms for the allocation of water from the Indus River and its tributaries, which are crucial for agricultural and economic activities in both northern India and Pakistan. While the IWT is often hailed as a success story in the larger discourse of geopolitical conflict resolution between two countries which have a fraught relationship at best, it has remained a source of tension and its effectiveness is diminishing. Incendiary statements by representatives on both sides and threats of abrogation have become increasingly frequent. Much of this also stems from the fact that there is room for interpretation of technical details with regards to development on the rivers. Additionally, the 64-year-old treaty has little connection to the present. In light of escalating climate change impacts, a critical need emerges for the integration of climate proofing within the IWT framework. Presently, there exists a notable absence of an adaptable framework that addresses current issues of water availability and quality which has started to decline in the region. For a stronger Indus Water Treaty both countries need to change their focus from water sharing to equitable benefit sharing.
Amidst regional tensions, Pakistan consistently objects to India’s construction of dams and hydropower projects. This is evident in actions like the convening of a Court of Arbitration (CoA) to address disputes concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian officials threatened to use water as a tool in response to the Uri attack in 2016 carried out by the Jaish-e-Mohammad, highlighting the challenges of hydro diplomacy in a politically charged environment. On Pakistan’s western front with Afghanistan, there are uncertainties over the shared Kabul River Basin, one of the most populated basins in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been trying to reach a deal with Afghanistan over the Kabul River for decades. However, the likelihood of the two countries signing a deal to regulate water use and distribution is low. Afghanistan is upstream from several major river basins in the region, and all its neighbours, including Pakistan, are dependent on the country. Afghanistan’s waters are badly managed, with little hydro-diplomacy to support the management of resources with any of its neighbours.
Furthermore, Afghanistan’s internal political challenges have resulted in the suspension of critical water projects, such as the Pashdan Dam, a hydroelectric facility situated in the Karokh district, where only 85 percent of the construction has been completed.While the current Taliban government has proposed to resume+ work on the facility, there is a budget issue.10 The country continues to suffer from ineffective water utilisation, contributing to low economic growth. This not only impacts the country’s overall development but also hinders the prospects of fostering regional cooperation. While Pakistan might hope for increased cooperation with the current Taliban government, there is little guarantee that existing flashes of conflict over water will abate.
In eastern part of South Asia, the Ganga-Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo-Meghna Basin, shared by five countries, in one of the least integrated regions globally. The Brahmaputra River often serves as a geopolitical tool for both India and China, influencing the dynamics in South Asia. This impact is felt by all countries in the region, including Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan, as they experience negative consequences of unilateral actions. The construction of dams and other infrastructure by all, sometimes aimed at controlling the river flow, has led to conflict of interest and power struggles. China has been constructing a 60,000-megawatt project on the Yarlung Tsangpo, close to India’s borders in the northeast. In response, India initiated a significant hydroelectric project, to generate 11,000 megawatts, in Upper Subansiri, Arunachal Pradesh. This competition exacerbates existing bilateral tensions and triggers a race to build dams, resulting in detrimental consequences for the delicate ecology and human security of the region. It is also worth noting that a significant number of streams and rivers traverse national boundaries, interacting with political and sectoral divisions and exacerbating complexities.
In 2017, during the 73-day Doklam stand-off, China stopped sharing Brahmaputra water flow data with India. Both countries have a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) under which China shares water flow data from May 15 to October 15 every year with India. While China stated that the two events were unconnected, better cooperation and open channels of communication could ensure that water and subsequently lives and livelihoods do not get entangled in larger geopolitical events, borrowing from the cooperation on joint research over glaciers for example. There is a need to look beyond the existing challenges and border issues for establishing an institutional mechanism that ensures transparency and accountability in the sharing of the Brahmaputra River, safeguarded from political posturing.
The profound ramifications of China and India’s ambitious dam construction initiatives on downstream riparian states have significant implications for the neighbourhood. While India has agreements with Bangladesh and Nepal, basin-wide cooperation that fundamentally examines the rivers beyond political boundaries remains elusive. Though data sharing between India and China resumed in 2018 and the decision was made to continue cooperation on hydrological information, water resources are a controversial issue between India and China. Therefore, sharing of information and data over shared water is a new tool complicating diplomatic engagements and dialogues regarding transboundary water conflict.
Future Climate Shocks
Climate change remains a major factor contributing to water conflict between neighbouring countries in the form of floods, uncertain rainfall, longer periods of drought and heat amongst other weather uncertainties. They heighten the stress among communities and countries, making water, a trigger and a cause in regional conflict. The displacement of vulnerable groups, like ethnic Pashtuns escaping floods in northern Pakistan, Muslims leaving drought-affected rural areas in India, and Rohingya refugees fleeing flooded cities in Bangladesh, could escalate communal tensions and violence in the communities they relocate to. The historical resentment from the local population towards previous waves of migrants adds a layer of complexity to the situation, emphasising climate-induced conflict.
Historically, the four months of the monsoon are responsible for 80 percent of the annual rainfall in South Asia. But due to climate change, the water cycle has shifted, resulting in both intense downpours and extended drought. In 2022, some parts of Pakistan received 400–500 percent more precipitation than usual. This led to devastating floods with a loss of life in thousands and billions of dollars in damage (approximately USD 14-15 billion). The rising temperatures, and erratic rainfall patterns are all impacting the Indus River, a primary source of food security in Pakistan. These environmental changes are increasingly affecting agricultural practices, food production, and overall livelihoods. Presently, 39 percent of the population grapples with multidimensional poverty, further intensifying the loss of livelihoods and potentially increasing instances of violence.
In many parts of South Asia, agriculture relies on the extraction of groundwater, accounting for up to 90 percent of usage. The over-extraction of groundwater is a significant issue, especially in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan, where an estimated 23 million pumps are in use. Groundwater utilisation is inherently more resilient to an erratic climate and despite the absence of substantial recharge demand will grow. While energy requirements and food security continue to challenge the growth of riparian states, changing monsoon patterns increase the potential for conflicts over scarce resources – land, water or energy.
Simultaneously, the ongoing global phenomena of ocean warming and ice cap melt contribute to the escalation of sea levels on the one hand and unpredictable avalanches and damage to the Himalayan ecosystem on the other. Sea level rise, compounded by the intensification of cyclones and storms, poses a heightened risk to coastal aquifers. Notably, Bangladesh and Pakistan are particularly susceptible to the repercussions of rising sea levels, with coastal areas in India and Sri Lanka also poised to encounter significant impacts. The melting ice caps and rising heat will have ramifications that are still not yet completely understood, both to the mountain communities of India, Nepal, Tibet and Bhutan but also to the dependant riverine communities in the plains of India, China and Bangladesh.
Conclusion
The projected global fresh water demand is anticipated to exceed supply by approximately 40 percent to 50 percent by the year 2030. It is imperative to recognise that climate change’s most conspicuous impact manifests through alterations in water dynamics, affecting all countries. As these communities reliant on transboundary rivers grapple with various crises, fostering cooperation becomes paramount. Addressing longstanding issues, renegotiating water treaties, and adapting to evolving climate patterns are essential steps towards a sustainable and secure water future for the entire region. While basin wide lasting cooperation will be difficult, the process matters and dialogue on smaller issues matter as well. A paradigm shift from the traditional concept of river control towards holistic river management is imperative. The shared waters of the river basins in South Asia demand a collaborative and forward-thinking approach from upper riparian nations like India and China. Achieving more efficient and transparent risk-informed water governance across South Asia is essential.
Using existing mechanisms could be the way forward in building trust and subsequently expanding them to include other areas and countries. The data sharing MoU between India and China, the joint research on glacial changes or existing agreements on smaller rivers are potential entry points to begin cooperation in other areas. Creating more robust economic integration in the region to boost food and energy production through shared development of flood plains are ways to maximise output and generate faster growth. With the proliferation of urban centres within the river basins across the region and the heightened vulnerability to climate induced disruptions, a fundamental shift in financial and future development strategies is necessary. India has a number of domestic strategies that promote resilience, comprehensive urban growth and water security that can be adapted to the regional context. The targeted “Catch the Rain: Where it Falls and When it Falls” campaign, aims to involve the community and address multiple issues of groundwater depletion, scarcity and drought. It involves collecting, storing, conveying, and purifying rainwater from rooftops, parks, roads, and open grounds. Not only does it place a certain onus on the community, involving everyone, it ensures that there is collective responsibility that is easy to scale. Even if one ignores the need to safeguard a resource that seems unlimited or the calls for more cooperation that seem highly unrealistic and optimistic, cooperation makes good economic sense for countries that have high growth ambitions.
While large-scale conflict over transboundary waters is less likely and often easier to predict and thus prevent, water often becomes a threat multiplier or a casualty in political posturing. While no major war in South Asia has been fought over water, the same can no longer be held for the future. In any case, the local populations are the hardest hit, which leads to a cycle of discontent, migration, and potentially further conflict. Along with climate change, technology and energy security are also beginning to play an important role in this dynamic, forcing societies to change how they examine their relationship between water and security. We can let our politics influence our shared waters until one day there is little left to share, or we can let the water serve as a catalyst for cooperative efforts to foster sustainable development and, potentially, peace.
Originally featured by ORCA in April 2024.
